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How Explanation Guides ConﬁrmationNevin Climenhaga*y
Where E is the proposition that [If H and O were true, H would explain O], William
Roche and Elliot Sober have argued that P(H F O&E)5 P(H F O). In this article I argue
that not only is this equality not generally true, it is false in the very kinds of cases that
Roche and Sober focus on, involving frequency data. In fact, in such cases O raises the
probability of H only given that there is an explanatory connection between them.In two recent essays, Roche and Sober (2013, 2014) argue that the proposi-
tion that a hypothesis H would explain an observation O is evidentially irrel-
evant to H.Where E says that, were H and O true, H would explain O, Roche
and Sober’s thesis is that
P H O&Ej Þ 5 P Hð jOð Þ: (1)
Once we know O, Roche and Sober claim, E gives us no further evidence
that H is true. In other words, O screens off E from H. Call this claim the
Screening-Off Thesis (SOT; Roche and Sober 2014, 193).
In endorsing SOT, Roche and Sober are presumably not making a claim
about subjective probabilities, for an agent could virtually always assign co-
herent subjective probabilities on which the above equality is false. I will in-
stead read them as making a claim about epistemic probabilities, which we
can understand as rationally constraining subjective probabilities.
Theses similar to SOT are endorsed by other Bayesians skeptical of in-
ference to the best explanation. For example, van Fraassen (1989, 166) fa-
mously denies that the claim that a hypothesis is explanatory can give it any
probabilistic “bonus.” Often, however, such skeptics do not make clear in
precisely what way they think that explanation is irrelevant to conﬁrmation.*To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Notre
Dame; e-mail: nclimenh@nd.edu.
yI am grateful to Robert Audi, Daniel Immerman, Ted Poston, and two reviewers for Phi-
losophy of Science for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
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All uVan Fraassen does consider a precise version of inference to the best expla-
nation, but it is an uncharitable one, on which inference to the best explana-
tion is understood as a non-Bayesian updating rule on which good explana-
tions get higher probabilities than Bayesian conditionalization would give
them.1 Roche and Sober are thus to be commended for stating a precise anti-
explanationist thesis that does not mischaracterize their opponents’ position.
If SOT is true, there is a clear sense in which explanation is not relevant to
conﬁrmation.
That said, we do need to clarify the scope of SOT before we can evaluate
its signiﬁcance and plausibility. It is widely acknowledged by Bayesians that
all conﬁrmation is relative to a context. In other words, we always have some
background knowledge K, which may be left implicit but is always guiding
our judgments of probability. While subjective Bayesians often think of this
background as being part of the probability function P() itself, for epistemic
probabilities, it is preferable to make K explicit as a conjunct of the propo-
sition being conditioned on.2 So we can rewrite Roche and Sober’s claim as
P H O&E&Kj Þ 5 P Hð jO&Kð Þ: (2)
Here H, O, and K are variables that could be ﬁlled in with various proposi-
tions or background knowledge, with the caveat that H is a hypothesis and O
an observational statement. We can then ask: for which H, O, and K do
Roche and Sober take (2) to be true?
The most straightforward interpretation of SOT is as a universal claim:
for all O, H, and K, P(H F O&E&K) 5 P(H F O&K). However, this inter-
pretation is uncharitable because it is trivially false. For example, suppose K
includes the material conditional [(O&E) ⊃ H] but does not include the ma-
terial conditional [O ⊃H]. (Perhaps an oracle who knows whether O, H, and
E are true has told you that if O and E are true, so is H.) Then P(H F
O&E&K) 5 1, but P(H F O&K) < 1. Hence,31. Some explanationists have defended this rule against van Fraassen’s criticisms of it (see,
e.g., Douven 2013). However, whether or not van Fraassen’s original arguments against
non-Bayesian explanationist updating rules work, I show (Climenhaga, forthcoming) that
such rules lead to synchronic probabilistic incoherence. The argument of this article suggests
that it would be better to think of the “probabilistic bonus” that explanation gives to a hy-
pothesis H as the degree to which the proposition that H is explanatory conﬁrms H.
2. Making K part of the probability function itself makes it impossible to “bring out” any
part of K in the way one brings out the evidence in Bayes’s Theorem—i.e., where X is a
conjunct of K and Y is an arbitrary proposition, the probability of X given Y will always
equal 1. This leads to a version of the old evidence problem. By contrast, if K is one of
the propositions conditioned on, and not part of the probability function itself, then X can
be brought out in such a way that the probability of X given Y does not necessarily equal
1. (For more on this point, see sec. 3 of Climenhaga [2017].)
3. Roche and Sober consider the possibility of counterexamples to SOT if one drops the
standard Bayesian assumption of logical omniscience: “Let I be the proposition that H
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DISCUSSION 361P H O&E&Kj Þ > P Hð jO&Kð Þ: (3)
Although the above example shows SOT to not be universally true,
[(O&E) ⊃ H] is not the kind of information we would ordinary have as part
of our background knowledge. In endorsing SOT, then, Roche and Sober
presumably mean to hold that (2) is true in ordinary or paradigm cases, in
particular, the kinds of cases in which defenders of inference to the best ex-
planation wish to claim that explanatoriness is evidentially relevant. I will
now argue that even so restricted, SOT is false. I will do this by considering
one of the paradigmatic statistical cases Roche and Sober use to argue for
SOT, involving smoking and cancer.
Suppose that K includes statistical data on which smoking and cancer are
correlated as well as the base rate of cancer in the population. Roche and
Sober (2013, 660) and I agree that in this case
P S gets cancer½  S smokes½ &Kj Þ > P S gets cancer½ ð jKð Þ, (4)
which implies
P S smokes½  S gets cancer½ &Kj Þ > P S smokes½ ð jKð Þ: (5)
In a response to Roche and Sober (2013), McCain and Poston (2014, 150)
brieﬂy argue that the frequency data in K make (4) true only because they
support the existence of some causal connection between smoking and can-
cer:4 “The data indicated that there was some causal process—albeit un-
known at that time—that explains the correlation between smoking and4. McCain and Poston’s main claim in that paper is that even if SOT is true, explanato-
riness can still play an evidential role by increasing the “resiliency” of probabilities. In
my view this is based on a mistaken view about epistemic probabilities. As I understand
it, the epistemic probability of H given O&K, P(H FO&K), is a relation between the prop-
ositions H and O&K, such that, if P(H F O&K) 5 n, then someone with O&K as their
evidence ought to be conﬁdent in H to degree n. Following Keynes (1921), I take this re-
lationship to be metaphysically necessary and knowable a priori, like the laws of logic or
logically implies O. Then, plausibly, there can be cases in which Pr(H FO&I) > Pr(H F O)
and Pr(H FO&I&E) > Pr(H FO). Perhaps there can even be cases in which Pr(H FO&E) >
Pr(H F O). This would be especially plausible if E were in some way indicative of I. But
then the point would be that Pr(H FO&I&E)5 Pr(H F O&I). Explanatoriness has no con-
ﬁrmational signiﬁcance, once purely logical and mathematical facts are taken into ac-
count” (2014, 195). However, these comments do not undermine the counterexample in
the text. First, that counterexample involves knowledge of a material implication, not a
logical implication. ([(O&E) ⊃ H] could equivalently be stated as [~(O&E) v H].) Thus,
the assumption that there are some contexts inwhich one does not know [(O&E) ⊃H] does
not violate logical omniscience. Second, Roche and Sober’s example involves I describing
an implication relationship between O and H on their own. This is what lets them say that
P(H FO&E&I)5 P(H FO&I). In the counterexample in the text, K says that O&E, but not
O, implies H. Hence, in the circumstances I have described, P(H FO&E&K) > P(H FO&K).
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All ulung cancer. . . . Exactly this feature—a justiﬁed belief in an unknown ex-
planatory story—plays a crucial role in using the data from observation to
get justiﬁed beliefs about the relevant frequencies. Apart from a general jus-
tiﬁed belief in some explanatory story accounting for that data, the obser-
vational data would not justify beliefs about the relevant frequencies.” Al-
though McCain and Poston are talking about objective frequencies and not
epistemic probabilities in this quote, it is similarly true that [S smokes] sup-
ports [S gets cancer] relative to K only because K supports the existence of
an explanatory connection between [S smokes] and [S gets cancer]. As I go
on to argue, this means that SOT is false.
McCain and Poston do not formalize this point and perhaps for this rea-
son do not recognize this implication of it. Instead they write that it shows
that “even if one grants Roche and Sober’s claim that ‘O screens-off E from
H’ this doesn’t show that explanatory considerations are irrelevant to conﬁr-
mation” (2014, 150).5 But it does not show this. Rather, it shows that explan-
atory considerations are relevant to conﬁrmation precisely because Roche
and Sober’s SOT (or a near cousin, as I clarify below) is false. (McCain
and Poston’s confusion on this point may be part of the reason that Roche
and Sober do not reply to it in their [2014] response to McCain and Poston.)
Roche and Sober (2013, 661) hold that, as SOT implies in this case,
P S smokes½  S gets cancer½ &E&Kj Þ5P S smokes½ ð j S gets cancer½ &Kð Þ, (6)
where E is the proposition [If (S smokes) and (S gets cancer) were true, (S
smokes) would explain (S gets cancer)]. Roche and Sober claim that “a
good estimate of the probability on the right [of (6)] is furnished by frequency
data; the same estimate is a good one for the probability on the left” (663).
I claim that (6) is not in general true. One reason this is hard to see imme-
diately is that (6) involves the counterfactual [If (S smokes) and (S gets can-mathematics. Learning new empirical information, like E, does not affect the value or re-
silience of P(H F O&K). The value of this probability does not change, just as whether
A&B entails A does not change. Rather, learning E simply makes a new probability rele-
vant to what we should believe, namely, P(H FO&E&K), because nowO&E&Kdescribes
our total evidence.
5. Immediately after this, McCain and Poston say, “Explanatory considerations are al-
ready at work in setting Pr(H F O)—having E provide additional conﬁrmation for H
would be akin to double-counting the information about objective chances” (2014, 150).
This suggests that they may be thinking of ‘Pr(H F O)’ as a frequency. But Roche and So-
ber’s SOT is not about frequencies (although Roche and Sober may invite confusion on this
point by moving back and forth between discussing epistemic probabilities and frequencies
themselves). Or perhaps McCain and Poston are suggesting that the existence of an explan-
atory connection between smoking and cancer is part of the background information K. (In
this case P(H FO&E&K)would equal P(H FO&K) becauseK andE&Kwould be logically
equivalent.) However, the existence of an explanatory connection is neither directly ob-
served nor entailed by facts that are directly observed. Hence, it should not be included in K.
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DISCUSSION 363cer) were true, (S smokes) would explain (S gets cancer)]. In ordinary circum-
stances we would only get evidence for a counterfactual about a particular
case like this by getting evidence for broader explanatory claims like [In gen-
eral, smoking causes cancer]. As such, it will be helpful to start by considering
claims of this form.
Say that there is an explanatory connection between two phenomena X
and Y if and only if, at least sometimes, X causes Y, Y causes X, or X and Y
have a common cause.6 Let C1 be the hypothesis that smoking causes can-
cer, C2 the hypothesis that cancer causes smoking, and C3 the hypothesis
that they have a common cause. Then, ~[C1vC2vC3] is the claim that there
is no explanatory connection between smoking and cancer.
Let us now consider a revised Screening-Off Thesis, SOT*, which says
that the existence of general explanatory connections is evidentially irrele-
vant. In this context, SOT* says that6. I h
7. Th
All WhereC1 says that sometimes smoking causes cancer, P([S smokes]F [S gets
cancer]&C1&K)5 P([S smokes] F [S gets cancer]&K).I will now show that SOT* is false in this context.
First, note that
Pð S gets cancer½  S smokes½ &∼ C1vC2vC3½ &Kj Þ
5 P S gets cancer½ ð j∼ C1vC2vC3½ &KÞ:(7)
This is because on the (extremely unlikely) hypothesis that there is no ex-
planatory connection between smoking and cancer, the observed frequency
data are a huge ﬂuke. But we should not expect huge ﬂukes to continue. If
the observed association of smoking and cancer is merely coincidental, then
we should expect future smokers that we observe to have cancer at the same
rate as the rest of the population. So if we know that ~[C1vC2vC3], learning
that S smokes does not raise the probability that S gets cancer above the
probability given by the base rate of cancer in the population.
An anonymous reviewer suggests the following objection to this argu-
ment. Equation (7) is an instance of the more general principle
(7)P(A FB&[there is no explanatory connection between A&B]&K)5 P(A F
[there is no explanatory connection between A&B]&K).However, this principle is subject to counterexample.7 Sober (2001) ob-
serves that although there is no explanatory connection between the priceere ignore noncausal forms of explanation.
is counterexamplewas originally applied to an analogous principle about frequencies.
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All uof bread in Britain and the height of the sea in Venice, they are nevertheless
correlated: they both tend to increase over time. As such, if K reports the
bread price in Britain and the sea level in Venice historically, B says that
the sea level in Venice is x at some unspeciﬁed future time t, and A says that
the bread price in Britain is y at t, then this equality is false. For example,
learning that the sea level in Venice is much higher than at present raises the
probability that the bread price is also much higher than at present.
Assuming that time is not a common cause of A and B, then I accept the
counterexample to the above principle, but I still hold that the principle is
true in the current case. For, as Steel (2003, 313) observes, “British bread
prices provide information about Venetian tides (and vice versa) only in vir-
tue of telling us something about the time” (emphasis his). Knowledge of
the time t screens off the bread prices from the sea levels. The above princi-
ple is plausibly true when any relevant temporal information is built into our
background K, which we can stipulate is the case in the smoking and cancer
example.
Even if this is not right, Sober (2001, 342–43) agrees that separate cause
explanations “often” do not predict correlations, and I think he should accept
that (7) is such a case. According to Sober, inference to a common cause is
often rational because it is frequently the case that a common cause expla-
nation predicts a correlation when a separate cause explanation does not.
(Sober is considering cases in which it is obvious that neither A nor B causes
the other, so a common cause is the only explanatory relation available.)
However, it is clearly rational to infer a causal relationship between smoking
and cancer from the frequency data in K. Hence, Sober’s reasoning would
suggest that (7) is a case in which the above principle is true.
It follows from (7) that
Pð S smokes½  S gets cancer½ &∼ C1vC2vC3½ &Kj Þ
5 P S smokes½ ð j∼ C1vC2vC3½ &KÞ:(8)
Presumably learning ~[C1vC2vC3] on its own does not affect the probability
of [S smokes] relative only to our background knowledge K: without any
information about whether S has cancer, these two propositions are irrele-
vant to each other. Hence,
P S smokes½  ∼ C1vC2vC3½ &Kj Þ 5 P S smokes½ ð jKð Þ: (9)
From (8) and (9) it follows that
P S smokes½  S gets cancer½ &∼ C1vC2vC3½ &Kj Þ 5 P S smokes½ ð jKð Þ: (10)
In other words, learning that there is no explanatory connection between
smoking and cancer and that S has cancer does not raise the probability that
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DISCUSSION 365S smokes. However, according to (5), that S gets cancer raises the probabil-
ity that S smokes. For (5) to be true, it must then be the case that learning
that S smokes and that there is an explanatory connection between smoking
and cancer raises the probability that S gets cancer. That is, from (5) and
(10) it follows that
P S smokes½  S gets cancer½ & C1vC2vC3½ &Kj Þ > P S smokes½ ð jKð Þ: (11)
From (10) and (11) it follows that
Pð S smokes½  S gets cancer½ & C1vC2vC3½ &Kj Þ
> P S smokes½ ð j S gets cancer½ &∼ C1vC2vC3½ &KÞ,(12)
which implies that
Pð S smokes½  S gets cancer½ & C1vC2vC3½ &Kj Þ
> P S smokes½ ð j S gets cancer½ &KÞ:(13)
Presumably any one of C1, C2, and C3 also licenses extrapolation from
our frequency data. Consequently, we can replace C1vC2vC3 with any one
of C1, C2, and C3, and (11)–(13) will remain true. In particular, it will be true
that
Pð S smokes½  S gets cancer½ &C1&Kj Þ
> P S smokes½ ð j S gets cancer½ &KÞ:(14)
Equation (14) contradicts SOT*. So SOT* is false.8
This example shows two other things. First, it shows that Roche and So-
ber are wrong to claim (2013, 662) that the asymmetry of explanation sug-
gests that explanatory facts like C1 cannot be conﬁrmatory. As they observe,
(12)
(13)
(14)8. An anonymous reviewer suggests the following argument against (14): P([S smokes] F
[S gets cancer]&K) should be equal to the frequency of cancer among smokers given byK.
But then (14) implies that P([S smokes] F [S gets cancer]&C1&K) is greater than the fre-
quency of cancer among smokers, which seemswrong.My response to this argument is to
reject its ﬁrst premise: K includes data on the correlations between cancer and smoking in
previously observed cases.We are extrapolating from these data to a new case, and in gen-
eral we should not follow the “straight rule” in so extrapolating (compare Roche and So-
ber’s [2013, 663] coin toss example). This is clear in extreme cases: if all the people with
cancer we have observed so far have been smokers, we should still not be 100% conﬁdent
that the next person with cancer we observe will be a smoker. It is true that, as data accu-
mulate, our new probabilities should tend to approach observed frequencies. But this is
compatible with (14). The probability on the left-hand side of (14) is closer to the observed
frequency of smoking among people with cancer than the probability on the right-hand
side, but both values approach this frequency as the number of samples in K increases.
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All uconﬁrmation is symmetric whereas explanation is not. If X explains Y, Y does
not explain X, but if P(X F Y&K) > P(X F K), P(Y F X&K) > P(Y F K). But
this does not mean that [X explains Y] should not make a difference to the de-
gree to which Y conﬁrms X. In the above example, C1 raises the probability
of [S gets cancer] not by ruling out C2 and C3 but by ruling out ~[C1vC2vC3].
So [X explains Y] can support Y not by ruling out [Yexplains X] but by rul-
ing out [There is no explanatory connection between X and Y].9
Second, note that (10) and (11) together say that [S gets cancer] raises the
probability that [S smokes] when it is conjoined with the claim that there is
an explanatory connection between smoking and cancer but not when it is
conjoined with the claim that there is no explanatory connection between
them. In other words, the existence of an explanatory connection between
cancer and smoking is precisely what licenses the inference from S’s smok-
ing to S’s cancer. Moreover, (8) says that ~[C1vC2vC3] screens off [S gets
cancer] from [S smokes]. The situation is thus almost the opposite of what
Roche and Sober claim: not only does our observation not screen off our ex-
planatory claim from our hypothesis, the negation of our explanatory claim
(~[C1vC2vC3]) screens off our observation from our hypothesis. Our explan-
atory claim thus mediates the move from observation to hypothesis.10
Equation (14) shows SOT* to be false. What about SOT? SOT implies
equation (6) obtains, where E says that [If (S smokes) and (S gets cancer)
were true, (S smokes) would explain (S gets cancer)]. If, by contrast, E is
positively relevant to [S smokes], then
Pð S smokes½  S gets cancer½ &E&Kj Þ
> P S smokes½ ð j S gets cancer½ &KÞ:(15)
We can break down the left-hand and right-hand sides of (6) and (15) as follows:
P S smokes½ j S gets cancer½ &E&Kð Þ
5 P C1 S gets cancer½ &E&Kj ÞP S smokes½ ð j S gets cancer½ &E&C1&Kð Þ
1 P ∼C1 S gets cancer½ &E&Kj ÞP S smokes½ ð j S gets cancer½ &E&∼C1&Kð Þ,
(16)
(15)9. It is compatible with this that the order of explanation is evidentially irrelevant, in that X
conﬁrmsY to the same degree regardless of what the explanatory relationship between them
is. But even this does not follow from Roche and Sober’s observation that conﬁrmation is
symmetric. For conﬁrmation is only qualitatively symmetric: X conﬁrms Y if and only if
Y conﬁrms X. It is not plausibly quantitatively symmetric: in general, X does not conﬁrm
Y to the same degree that Y conﬁrms X (Eells and Fitelson 2002). So, for all Roche and So-
ber have said, X might well conﬁrm Y more (or less) if Y explains X than if X explains Y.
10. In Climenhaga (2017), I formalize the idea that explanatory connections mediate
conﬁrmation in terms of Bayesian networks.
(16)
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DISCUSSION 367P S smokes½ j S gets cancer½ &Kð Þ
5 P C1 S gets cancer½ &Kj ÞP S smokes½ ð j S gets cancer½ &C1&Kð Þ
1 P ∼C1 S gets cancer½ &Kj ÞP S smokes½ ð j S gets cancer½ &∼C1&Kð Þ:
(17)
Plausibly,
P C1 S gets cancer½ &E&Kj Þ > P C1ð j S gets cancer½ &Kð Þ, (18)
and
Pð S smokes½  S gets cancer½ &E&C1&Kj Þ
≥ P S smokes½ ð j S gets cancer½ &C1&KÞ:(19)
Equation (18) says that, given that S gets cancer, [(S smokes) would explain (S
gets cancer) if (S smokes) were true] makes it more likely that there exists at
least one instance of someone getting cancer because of smoking.11 Equation
(19) says that, if we know that [S gets cancer]&C1&K, E does not make [S
smokes] less likely. It follows from (18) and (19) that the ﬁrst summand in
(16) is greater than the ﬁrst summand in (17).
However, this does not yet show that (15) is true. This is because
P S smokes½ j S gets cancer½ &E& ∼C1&Kð Þ 5 0, (20)
and so the second summand in (16) equals 0, and hence is less than the sec-
ond summand in (17). Equation (20) is true because, if smoking never causes
cancer, and S gets cancer, then it cannot be the case that S’s smoking causes
S’s cancer. However, if it’s the case that, were S to smoke and get cancer, S’s
smoking would be the cause of S’s cancer and it’s the case that S gets can-
cer, then if S smokes, S’s smoking must cause S’s cancer. Hence, the only
way for [S gets cancer]&E&~C1 to be true is for it to be the case that S does
not smoke.
Nevertheless, for (6) to be true the second summand in (17) would need
to exactly equal the difference between the ﬁrst summand in (16) and the
(17)
(19)11. In an earlier version of this article, I claimed that E entails C1. However, an anony-
mous reviewer pointed out to me that this is not true, even holding ﬁxed the above back-
ground knowledge. For example, suppose that smoking never has and never will cause
cancer, so that C1 is false. S, for his part, does not smoke. Nevertheless, because of S’s
unique physiology and the chemical properties of tobacco, it is true that were S to smoke,
his smoking would cause him to have cancer. In this case E is true, but C1 remains false.
However, inasmuch as a scenario like this in which E is true and C1 is false is incredibly
unlikely, it remains extremely plausible that E conﬁrms C1, even if it does not entail it.
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All uﬁrst summand in (17). While this could be the case, there is no reason to
expect it a priori. Hence, far from being a general truth, if (6) is true in this
case it is only by fortuitous coincidence.
More importantly, the negative inﬂuence of E on [S smokes] sketched
above is not the kind of inﬂuence that either proponents or opponents of in-
ference to the best explanation have had in mind when disagreeing about
whether explanation is relevant to conﬁrmation. And if we build intoK infor-
mation that screens off this inﬂuence, then (15) is true. For example, imagine
that we know that nothing apart from smoking will give S cancer (and that S
will not get cancer for no reason). In this case P(~C1 F [S gets cancer]&K)5
0—if the only way for S to get cancer is from smoking, then if S gets cancer
it is because of S’s smoking, and so C1 is true. Hence, the second summand
in both (16) and (17) is 0, and the dominance of (16)’s ﬁrst summand over
(17)’sﬁrst summand is sufﬁcient for it to be the case that equation (15) is true.
I have argued in this article that Roche and Sober’s thesis that the explan-
atory hypothesis [If H and O were true, H would explain O] is irrelevant to
conﬁrmation is not true in the kind of case they discuss, at least once we ﬁx
our background knowledge so as to screen off irrelevant information. I have
also shown that when we move to more tractable propositions describing
explanatory connections, such as those about general causal links between
smoking and cancer, not only are these relevant to conﬁrmation, they actually
mediate the connection between observations and theories: the observation
conﬁrms the theory (and vice versa) only insofar as we have evidence that the
described explanatory connection exists. Explanation not only adds conﬁrma-
tion; it guides conﬁrmation.REFERENCES
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